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The Duty to Dissent:  
Do the citizens of a participatory liberal democracy have a political duty to 
practice civil disobedience? 
 
Introduction 
 Throughout the history of 20th century democracies such as the United States, protest 
movements that encompassed both campaigning to spread awareness as well as breaking 
the law to highlight injustice have succeeded in overturning laws and securing legislation 
that has brought civil society closer to a state of justice. Prominent examples include the 
suffragist movement and civil rights campaigns. While these past movements often receive 
glowing praise both in popular media and in the literature, protest movements that are 
active in the present are often controversial. Although many political theorists and social 
commentators have justified breaking the law in the cause of justice, very few would argue 
that civil disobedience serves a function so important that its practice should constitute a 
duty of citizenship. This is despite the contributions protest movements have made to 
society that are widely recognized as essential.  
In addition to ending segregation and disenfranchisement for women, contributions 
made to society through civil disobedience include the establishment of the minimum wage 
and 40-hour work week after extensive sit-down protests in the 1930s. The creation of the US 
itself came about following unrest, such as the Boston Tea Party, due to political grievances. 
Anti-war protesters and conscientious objectors have ensured US military intervention in 
South East Asia and the Middle East remains controversial, and environmental activists 
have raised awareness and secured legislation related to ecological concerns. Democracy 
would be impoverished without citizens prepared to organize and promote such activities, 
which justifies regarding unlawful protest as legitimate and sometimes vital political 
participation. 
 In this dissertation I will argue that there is a duty to dissent that extends to 
breaking the law, and that it is a political and not simply a moral duty. Many writers have 
defended civil disobedience of the type I will describe, conceived of as a mode of political 
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speech that serves to communicate grievances to the government and to society at large. 
However, they fall short of endorsing a duty to dissent. Their accounts are characterized by 
limitations and extensive criteria that must be met before civil disobedience is warranted. I 
will ground my approach to civil disobedience from the perspective that we should not 
consider there to be a perfect duty to obey the law, because it is maintained and enforced by 
human beings that are ultimately fallible. Crucially, I will show that there is a structural 
need for a certain level of willingness to break the law and so there is no invalidating conflict 
with the general duty of citizens to be law-abiding. 
 In the first section I provide the definition of civil disobedience that I will use 
throughout, grounded in various conceptions found in the writings of John Rawls, Peter 
Singer, and Joseph Raz. Broadly, I regard protest action as a type of political speech which 
those who suffer from or recognize injustice can use to communicate their objections to the 
government and advocate for change. In the second section, I’ll put forwards the two 
strongest arguments for it.  
First, I argue that the majority rule characteristic of democracies prevents minorities 
from advocating for justice effectively without assistance from a socially conscious citizenry, 
creating the need for a civic obligation to dissent rather than relying upon personal 
motivations. Second, I will argue that a population that privileges obeying the law risks 
creating the conditions for a deterioration of liberal values and can potentially enable the 
government to become undemocratic. Then I will consider what reasonable limitations 
should be imposed on the duty to dissent to resolve its conflict with the duty to be law-
abiding. 
 With these two positive arguments on the table, in the third section I will examine 
the primary objection that could be raised to the duty of dissent: that arming citizens with a 
positive duty to break the law to achieve political objectives based on their personal 
appraisals would undermine the deliberative processes essential to the functioning of 
democracy and sponsor mass unrest leading to anarchy. I’ll provide two responses to this 
objection. First, that it is a slippery slope fallacy, and the threat of anarchy is a 
counterbalance to the threat of totalitarianism or other disastrous outcomes resulting from 
iniquitous government. Second, that the common sense of justice is comprised of an 
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amalgamation of the personal appraisals of citizens and so it would be paradoxical to oblige 
them to defer to it.  
My conclusion is that endorsing a defeasible duty to dissent, extending to unlawful 
acts but limited by rational assessment of needs and the self-interest of the dissenters, would 
act as a stabilizing influence on society and serve to bring it closer to a state of justice. 
 
1.1 Civil disobedience and the duty to dissent 
 I define the duty to dissent as a civic obligation to engage with the public sphere, 
registering dissatisfaction or disapproval, with the goal of moving civil society towards a 
state of justice. The main claim I want to defend is that this duty extends to unlawful acts, 
generally referred to as civil disobedience. Many political philosophers believe that civil 
disobedience can be permissible, but I propose that civil disobedience is sometimes a civic 
duty. Underpinning this claim is the fact that a liberal democracy in name alone cannot 
function. Its citizens as well as its institutions must regard the pursuit of justice as an 
indispensable goal, privileged over the maintenance of tranquility. 
 In defining civil disobedience, political theorists and philosophers have assembled a 
family of similar conceptions which differ in certain key respects. However, it is not 
necessary to endorse any one of these conceptions to defend the duty to dissent. I will 
instead refer to several writers throughout, principally Rawls, Raz, and Singer. There are 
broad themes common to all three – civil disobedience as a type of political speech that is 
illegal, non-violent, and seeks to communicate dissatisfaction or disapproval aimed at some 
law or policy with the goal of altering or overturning it.  
Howard Zinn’s characterization of civil disobedience matches closely the spirit in 
which I conceive of it: “Civil disobedience is the deliberate, discriminate violation of law for 
a vital social purpose. It becomes not only justifiable but necessary when a fundamental 
human right is at stake, and when legal channels are inadequate for securing that right. It 
may take the form of violating an obnoxious law, protesting an unjust condition, or 
symbolically enacting a desirable law or condition. It may or may not eventually be held 
legal, because of constitutional law or international law, but its aim is always to close the 
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gap between law and justice, as an infinite process in the development of democracy” 
(p119). 
The only controversial element of civil disobedience relevant to the duty to dissent is 
the non-violence criteria. While I agree that violence may come to be necessary in the 
resolution of some political crisis, I do not think that a citizen’s obligations can include 
pursuing a course of action to violent ends. The goal of democracy is an equitable social 
arrangement arrived at through reason and discussion rather than the imposition of force, so 
a need for violence would signal a breakdown of democratic processes that makes the term 
‘civil disobedience’ inapplicable (Rawls, p366). Besides non-violence, I do not think that the 
various other criteria – such as requiring that protesters submit to punishment or act 
publicly and openly – have any bearing on whether or not civil disobedience may be 
regarded as a civic obligation. 
Another important qualification is that it is in the context of participatory liberal 
democracies characteristic of western states in the latter 20th century that I want to argue this 
duty obtains. My claim is not about a platonic ideal of citizenship – the circumstances 
motivating my argument come from the history of western democracies, specifically the US. 
This is a point of departure from key texts, many of which make idealistic normative claims 
about the states in which civil disobedience can justifiably occur. Rawls defended civil 
disobedience as it obtains in a “more or less just democratic state” (p363) and argued that it 
had to be motivated by a violation of the common sense of justice of that society. Raz argued 
that civil disobedience in a democratic state is “beyond the bounds of toleration, beyond the 
general right to political action” (p273). He rejected the political right to civil disobedience in 
any liberal state where the right to adequate political participation is properly defended by 
the law. 
I think that these restrictive criteria undermine a robust description of civil 
disobedience, especially in the context of civic obligation. The problem is that citizens may 
be easily mistaken about whether these normative claims match up with their lived 
experience or not; the common sense of justice of a society, or if it is ‘more or less just’, is 
difficult to evaluate. So is the matter of whether the right to political participation is 
adequately established and protected. It’s only pragmatic to expect that there will be some 
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nuance in such matters. A society may be close to just for most of its members, but distinctly 
unjust for a small minority - consider the US during the Jim Crow era. Similarly, the 
procedures securing the right to political participation may be enshrined in law but the right 
in practice can be abridged due to bungled execution or deliberately unequal enforcement.  
Worse, not only may the public be unclear as to these points, there is good reason to 
think they will be deliberately misinformed. Most governments wish to project the 
appearance of legitimacy, as general elections in Russia or votes in the National People’s 
Congress in China attest. Unlike those countries, the US has an independent press that 
supposedly acts to keep the public informed about political matters. But after extensive 
analysis of the news media’s reporting of controversial issues, Noam Chomsky and Edward 
Herman concluded that “the mass media of the United States are effective and powerful 
ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by reliance 
on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship” (p306). 
Therefore, I think that the debate over civil disobedience is most illuminating when 
conducted in the context of the question ‘what obligations do citizens of particular countries 
have in the present time, given the distinct backgrounds of their societies?’. I also think it is 
preferable not to set any hard limits on what type of acts should be considered to constitute 
civil disobedience. So long as an illegal act serves as political speech seeking to oppose some 
policy or law, it will meet my definition of civil disobedience. I invoke a restriction on 
violence simply because it is irreconcilable with the ordinary course of events in a 
democracy, and I am concerned with defining a duty of dissent congruous with democratic 
principles. In the next section, I will present positive arguments in support of the duty to 
dissent. 
 
1.2 Why a political duty, beyond a moral right? 
Michele Moody Adams distilled the concept of conscientious citizenship from an 
analysis of Martin Luther King’s speeches and writings. This is the idea that we have a duty 
to bring about just institutions through resisting injustice in our society, as well as the 
injustices it is instrumental in bringing about for non-members, while maintaining respect 
for the rule of law (Moody Adams, p423). It is just such an ethos of committing civil 
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disobedience in response to injustice that I promote under the duty to dissent. However, 
moral duties and political duties are distinct. Arguing that poverty-stricken people who live 
in ghettos do not have the same duties as citizens better served by the social order, Tommie 
Shelby stated that “it is necessary to distinguish the civic obligations citizens have to each 
other from the natural duties all persons have as moral agents” (p2).  
Many prominent figures have advocated for the legitimacy of carrying out acts of 
civil disobedience based upon purely moral considerations. Martin Luther King appealed to 
universal human values derived from his religious faith to support his actions (p78), and 
Henry David Thoreau cited his moral condemnation of the war against Mexico and the 
institution of slavery as a justification when he refused to pay taxes (p129). It is generally 
agreed that our duty to be moral overrides other duties. For example, if we enter into a 
contract with somebody but find out later that there is an immoral element to fulfilling the 
agreement, it seems reasonable to prefer to shirk our duty to make good on our 
commitments rather than commit a wrongful act.  
The same may be said of our duty to uphold the ‘social contract’. Raz argued that 
any society that failed to protect its citizen’s rights to adequate political participation thereby 
entitled them to “exercise their moral right as if it were recognized by law” (p273). However, 
I claim that the duty to dissent is part of the political duties incumbent upon citizens of 
participatory liberal democracies. It therefore cannot be justified through nullification of the 
social contract. It’s important to delineate it as a political duty so that it can be properly 
weighed against the duty to be law-abiding, with which it comes into conflict.  
The duty to be law-abiding is well established and widely regarded, so there is a 
danger that too many citizens forgo acts of civil disobedience out of misguided deference to 
it and subsequently come to tolerate injustice. Zinn points out that history is replete with 
examples of populations submitting to or tolerating the infliction of inhumane conditions, 
while examples of successful resistance to injustice are far less common (p17). For example, 
African Americans suffered from the terrible violence of chattel slavery from 1619 until the 
formal end of the Civil War in 1865, and then further endured life under Jim Crow 
segregation laws until 1965. During this 346-year period, rebellions and uprisings like the 
one led by Nat Turner accomplished little except provoking ever-harsher laws oppressing 
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the slave caste. Violent suppression and forced displacement were also inflicted upon the 
indigenous inhabitants of the present-day US and Mexico, and enjoyed the acquiescence of 
mainstream society for centuries.  
There are two strong reasons for thinking that there is a political duty to dissent. The 
first is that minorities in a democracy - as well as those not afforded the rights of citizenship, 
such as slaves, immigrants, and non-members - are structurally susceptible to suffering due 
to the problem of the tyranny of the majority. Because of disparities in the levels of political 
influence and sheer numbers between different groups in society, some may be routinely 
ignored, outvoted, and overruled. The poverty-stricken ghetto residents described by Shelby 
(p2) are a pertinent example.  The duty to dissent would help to solve this problem, by 
obligating outside voices to bolster the attempts of minorities group to secure justice.  
The second reason to endorse the duty to dissent is that it is required to work against 
the forces of corruption, incompetence and bad faith governance as they erode liberal values 
in a democracy. As Thoreau put it, the concern is that the US government (and others like it) 
is a tradition “endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing 
some of its integrity” (p28). If the duty to be law-abiding is respected but the duty to dissent 
is not, there is a danger that citizens will too often take a neutral stance towards injustice 
which will encourage its propagation over time.  
I’ll now expand upon these two arguments, and then outline some reasonable 
limitations on the duty to dissent that should resolve any unwelcome conflict with the duty 
to be law-abiding.  
 
2.1 Assisting minorities in overcoming the tyranny of the majority  
 Since majority rule is fundamental to the nature of democracy there is a tendency for 
majority groups to ignore the interests of minority groups, sometimes to their detriment. 
Even if that minority protests vociferously, they may be dismissed as entitled malcontents 
by a public discourse dominated by majority interests. Such majority domination is not 
always simply the necessary product of resolving conflicts between strongly held yet 
opposing beliefs; the majority can care very little about something that deeply affects a 
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vulnerable minority and so oppress them indirectly as a side effect of facilitating frivolous 
conveniences or without even being conscious of doing so (Singer, p123). Worse, powerful 
groups may ride roughshod over even majority interests in a democracy due to exercising 
disproportionately strong political influence. 
For example, polls have shown that 77% of US citizens support laws making citizens 
unable to vote without first showing photo ID, purportedly due to concerns over voter fraud 
(Heimlich, 2012). While seemingly reasonable, the problem is that voter ID laws 
disproportionately affect voting eligibility for those with low socioeconomic status due to 
the inaccessibility of photo IDs for that group (Stanley, p69). And actual instances of voter 
fraud are vanishingly insignificant, only occurring at rates of between 0.0003% and 0.0025% 
(Levitt, pp13-15). The majority’s shallow apprehension of both the effects of voter ID laws 
and the realities of voter fraud could therefore result in needless disenfranchisement for 
many citizens. This example is especially pertinent to a discussion of civil disobedience 
because any affected citizens would lose their access to standard political participation. 
If the proper function of civil disobedience is to seek the redress of grievances, it will 
require a certain critical mass to be successful. Otherwise it will be too easily ignored or 
rationalized away by the majority. While the directly oppressed have both a moral 
justification and a personal motivation to engage in acts of protest, there are certain costs – 
time, material resources, and the risk of punishment including jail time – that will deter 
those who are satisfied by the moral principles justifying the act of protest but not actually 
suffering from the injustice themselves. Absent a political duty of dissent that extends to acts 
of civil disobedience, citizens may reasonably feel satisfied that the duty to be orderly and 
obey the law means they are under no compulsion to try and secure justice for minorities 
outside of the normal political procedures. 
 The tyranny of the majority does not affect only small groups of citizens. Wealth 
inequality compounds the problem of iniquitous majority rule in modern day representative 
democracies; politically powerful groups constitute only a small minority of the population 
but control a majority share of the wealth. Gilens and Page analyzed support for various 
policies across class divisions during the latter 20th century and found that 45% of policies 
favored by 80% of the wealthiest citizens were instituted, compared to only 18% of policies 
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that the same proportion of elites opposed (p574). They concluded that “economic elites and 
organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on 
U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or 
no independent influence” (Gilens and Page, p564). Therefore, the problem of tyranny of the 
majority does not only affect groups that constitute minorities by sheer numbers. 
Economically, most US citizens are in a minority group and their ability to access legitimate 
political representation reflects that fact. 
If the duty to dissent is granted, then those who recognize that an injustice is unlikely 
to be remedied through standard political procedure due to the problem of tyranny of the 
majority have a civic obligation to take further action to oppose that injustice. Without this 
compulsion, protest action may not function effectively to redress grievances as provided for 
by the First Amendment. 
 
2.2 Civil disobedience as a safeguard against tyranny 
 The second reason that a political rather than a moral duty to dissent should be 
recognized is that civil disobedience serves as one of the necessary checks and balances 
preventing the government from becoming despotic. The complacency of citizens in a liberal 
participatory democracy could enable the development of a tyrannical government, whether 
due to a deliberate project of subversion by the class of political elites, corruption by private 
interest groups, or simply incompetent governance.  
Economists describe the ‘tragedy of the commons’ – self-interested individuals 
worsening conditions for everybody, including themselves, by prioritizing short-term 
personal gains. Similarly, citizens may be united in accepting that protest is morally justified 
but still desist due to rational assessment of their own self-interest. The potential 
punishment may be too harsh, or the chance of achieving their goal too slim. If the choice to 
risk engaging in civil disobedience is only influenced by moral principles outside the 
schema of citizenship, there is the danger that the government will simply make sure the 
costs of dissent are prohibitively high.  
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 Going further, a failure to protest injustice effectively could actually induce 
despotism. Governments are not infallible: over time either unjust laws or policies will be 
introduced, or just laws or policies will be unevenly or incompetently enforced such that a 
state of injustice is created. If ordinary political procedures fail to prevent such injustices, 
then protest action is left as the last resort. Given that the government is compromised – 
either there are constituent elements deliberately pursuing the degradation of democracy 
and liberal values, or a state of justice is not maintained due to mismanagement – private 
citizens are de facto the only remaining agents capable of restoring justice.  
Consider two scenarios to illustrate this point. In the first, an unjustified war is 
started after a campaign of misinformation spread by a disproportionately influential 
minority in the government who seek to personally profit. There are no citizens who suffer 
oppression as a direct result so there is nobody for whom protesting the war is morally 
compelling enough to sacrifice their resources or otherwise act contrary to their self-interest. 
This is despite the fact that, if enough people organized in opposition, each individual has a 
very small chance of actually being punished. Delighted that they have suffered no political 
costs, the corrupt politicians are emboldened and subsequently become more inclined to risk 
pursuing unjust policies for personal gain. 
In the second scenario, a citizenry armed with the duty to dissent feel compelled to 
pursue a campaign of civil disobedience establishing opposition to the war, even though it is 
not exacting any toll on them personally. The corrupt politicians’ bluff is called, potentially 
ending the war. At the very least, the perpetrators will be forced to contend with negative 
publicity and unrest that serves to disincentivize them from pursuing similar policies in 
future. The function of a duty to dissent would be to ensure that the second scenario is 
standard. When civil disobedience is the only remaining potential obstacle to an unjust act 
or law, citizens in a position to protest who instead acquiesce are rightly viewed as having 
shirked their civic duty: to produce negative political outcomes for the perpetrators of that 
injustice. 
The actual history of warfare in the US during the past century demonstrates the 
need for civil disobedience beyond ordinary political participation. Conventional checks and 
balances have proven insufficient for averting the resolution of political crises with violence, 
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and the rights of citizens have been infringed upon to quell dissent. Often, both major party 
Presidential candidates endorse war, regardless of public opinion. More frustratingly, a 
candidate may campaign on an anti-war platform but then fail to make good on it. This 
happened in 1964, when Lyndon B. Johnson ran as the “peace candidate” against his pro-
war opponent Barry Goldwater but then greatly escalated the conflict in Vietnam the 
following year (Lerner, p752). Barack Obama also broke campaign promises to end the wars 
in Afghanistan (Ryan and DeYoung, 2016) and Iraq; while there were significant troop 
withdrawals, they were replaced by an extensive campaign of both conventional airstrikes 
and drone bombings (Benjamin, 2017). 
Of course, US citizens’ electoral influence is not limited to the President. They could 
still achieve representation through Congressional elections. However, Congress has 
demonstrated an unwillingness to oppose the President when it comes to warfare. No 
formal declaration of war was made during the Vietnam conflict, and while Lyndon B. 
Johnson gained congressional approval his successor, Richard Nixon, did not. In 2001, the 
Patriot Act was overwhelmingly approved by Congress. This included an unlimited 
authorization for the use of military force, so in the modern era the President can wage war 
without any further approval from the legislative branch.  
My two scenarios could be accused of constituting a ‘slippery slope’ argument, like 
the accusation that civil disobedience leads to mass disorder. But historically, civil 
disobedience has not precipitated wider unrest. Civil rights protests did not continue to 
gather momentum after the government passed the Civil Rights Act, nor did the suffragist 
campaign escalate beyond the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Both groups used 
limited and discriminate civil disobedience to achieve their aims without causing wider 
unrest (Zinn, p13). However, there has been a correlation between the government’s 
increasing tendency to use or sponsor violence to resolve political crises during the past 
century and the infringement of citizens’ rights in order to silence dissent. 
The US did not intervene in World War I for three years due to staunch public 
opposition and World War II was joined only slightly more readily. In contrast, by the early 
21st century, military action abroad had become commonplace. US forces fought in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan during the Obama 
13 
 
administration alone. President Dwight Eisenhower warned that the US housed a military-
industrial complex eager to promote violent conflict for financial gain. Lending credence to 
his assertion, 80% of retiring three or four-star generals and admirals of comparable rank 
gained highly lucrative employment with defense contractors or defense consulting firms 
during the Bush administration (Francis, 2013). In 2015, defense contractors were the top 
contributors to political action committees sponsoring electoral candidates (Dillow, 2015), 
which is a reason for concern given that the better-financed candidate wins 91% of the time 
(Lowery, 2014). 
While it may be argued that citizens have freedom of speech and legal protest at their 
disposal to oppose war, the government has proven willing to abridge or suspend these 
rights. During World War I, many people were charged under the Sedition Act which made 
it illegal to publicly condemn the war. The Bush administration became notorious for 
enforcing arbitrary “free speech zones”: areas up to half a mile away from where federal 
officials were appearing that protestors were forced to restrict themselves to or face arrest 
and trial on federal charges (American Civil Liberties Union, 2018).  
When the executive and legislative branches work together to wage war and 
suppress dissent, the only branch of government left to enforce the Constitution is the 
judiciary. However, the Supreme Court failed to oppose the Sedition Act or even consider 
the legality of the war in Vietnam when deciding cases related to protest charges (Zinn, p91). 
In recent years executive orders have been used to carry out extrajudicial assassinations 
against US citizens, a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 
All of this together is strong evidence to support the claim that civil disobedience is 
often the only avenue of representation available to citizens who oppose the undemocratic 
resolution of political crises with violence, which underpins the necessity of the duty to 
dissent. 
 
2.3 Conflict in the duties of citizenship 
It can be argued that while the duty to dissent exists, it only extends as far as 
authorized political activity because illegal acts conflict with the duty of citizens to be law-
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abiding. Even conceding the value of the goals of suffragists and civil rights campaigners, 
the hardline stance could be adopted that those groups acted unwisely by stoking unrest 
and should have restricted themselves to legal activities. In fact, this view is consistently 
pervasive. Polls have found that 55% of US citizens think that Black Lives Matter protests 
actually undermine the cause of racial equality, similar to the 57% that reported their belief 
that sit-ins and freedom rides were setting back the cause of desegregation in 1961 (Izadi, 
2016). This suggests a general prejudice against minority groups breaking the law for 
political reasons, regardless of the ultimate justice of their cause.  
But there is no reason the duty to dissent must result in an irresolvable conflict of 
duties for citizens: the duty to dissent is defeasible, as is the duty to adhere to the law. 
Consider the position of those serving in the armed forces. Article 92 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice establishes that there is a duty to follow ‘lawful’ orders; many soldiers have 
been prosecuted for illegal acts carried out under orders. Charles Keenan was convicted of 
murder in 1981 after obeying a direct order to shoot an elderly civilian in Vietnam, and 
similar cases emerged from Iraq and Afghanistan during the 21st century. Despite the 
apparent contradiction, soldiers are at the same time duty bound to obey orders from their 
superiors yet liable for punishment if those orders are later judged to be unlawful. Soldiers 
must therefore maintain their status as morally autonomous actors, able to critically analyze 
orders that they receive and refuse them if they are illegal or unconstitutional.  
The same reasoning should apply to citizens in a democracy. While there may be a 
perfect duty to be orderly in theory, in practice governments may be corrupt or incompetent 
and so citizens must be prepared to critically evaluate and potentially defy or obstruct them. 
German citizens who committed unjust but perfectly legal acts were rightfully brought to 
trial and punished at Nuremberg (Ferencz, p410). Although it could still be argued that 
protestors seeking justice should restrict themselves to legal methods out of respect for the 
necessarily slow-moving processes of representative democracy, this is difficult to defend 
given how little influence majority interests have on policy-making over time (Gilens and 
Page, p574). It’s also difficult to defend the layers of sluggish bureaucracy that facilitate 
representative democracy as necessary given modern technology that could realize a more 
Athenian style direct democracy (Singer, p104).  
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Expediency is a relevant factor. The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution 
recognizes the justice of ensuring that defendants are granted not just a fair trial, but a 
speedy one. Insisting that civil rights protestors should have restricted themselves to legal 
methods and waited patiently for equal rights to be extended to African Americans adds 
insult to the injury of their centuries-long struggle for justice. It also ignores the fact that 
individuals like Rosa Parks made instrumental contributions to the securing of those rights. 
The lawyer Harris Wofford, Jr. emphasized the value of the Montgomery Bus Boycott as 
political speech that made a positive contribution to public discourse. He argued that the 
legal system is not equipped to make systemic changes to society by itself, citing the words 
of Abraham Lincoln: “‘Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can 
fail; without it nothing can succeed’” (Wofford, p60). 
The further objection could be made that such cases still do not justify the duty to 
dissent’s legitimization of civil disobedience, because moral considerations along with self-
interest should act as sufficient motivation. However, the need for a positive duty to dissent 
becomes pronounced in cases where a bystander or somebody otherwise indirectly related 
to an injustice is in a small minority able to take action, and also faces prohibitively steep 
punishment for doing so. When a matter of injustice is known to only a few people, the 
public benefit of their feeling compelled to act becomes pronounced. Whistleblowers like 
Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden who leaked classified materials to the press to 
publicize unjust acts are a good example.  
Manning exposed the killing of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq by US forces, and 
Snowden revealed that the NSA was violating the Fourth Amendment rights of US citizens 
by operating a vast surveillance network in secret. Snowden brought surveillance into the 
purview of democratic institutions; the public cannot be opposed to an issue they have no 
knowledge of, and Congress cannot reasonably be relied upon to prevent government 
agencies from carrying out illicit activities if they abuse their position to do so in secret. Such 
cases support the claim that citizens of modern day democracies should consider it their 
positive duty to vigorously pursue exposing and ending situations of injustice, even when it 
means breaking the law.  
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I will now examine the limitations of the duty to dissent. As stated previously, I do 
not think it is required or desirable to specify precise limits on the types of civil disobedience 
that the duty to dissent endorses. It is better for an empowered and educated citizenry to 
make such ethical and practical decisions for themselves. But there are reasonable guidelines 
that ought to be followed, and relevant considerations to be weighed. Kimberley Brownlee 
described the importance of parsimonious response; civil disobedience is not justified when 
more orderly methods can achieve the same goal and shouldn’t pose a greater danger than 
the threat it opposes (p186). For example, we would not be justified in bombing a 
government building to protest an unfair allocation of public spending in the budget.  
It is also desirable to theorize a hierarchy of injustices by severity that merit different 
responses on a spectrum ranging from toleration to unlawful protest. Brownlee provides a 
well thought-out list of non-contingent human needs: “The categories of non-contingent 
basic need for persons include, first, the necessities for brute survival such as water, food, 
shelter, security, and companionship; second, basic skills and protections such as education; 
and third, protection of reasoning capacity, expressive agency, a degree of autonomy, social 
inclusion, respect, and recognition” (p190). It would be best to consider the failure to 
provide for these needs at the top of that hierarchy of injustices.  
Finally, there are the limits of self-interest for citizens. It seems unfair to blame other 
people who were aware of the NSA’s mass surveillance program for failing to expose it 
given how harshly whistleblowers are punished. Chelsea Manning was subjected to 
indefinite detention without trial for years, including solitary confinement. The duty to 
dissent bears differently depending on how much of a sacrifice an act of dissent constitutes, 
as well as how much social and political capital a citizen has. For instance, a highly educated 
upper-middle class person with all of their non-contingent needs met and the time and 
money to devote to protest action is under greater obligation to do so than somebody who is 
poor, under-served by the education system, and who must dedicate their time to securing 
their livelihood.   
So long as these considerations are duly weighed against the public good that can 
come from breaking the law, the duty to dissent will not present an irresolvable conflict of 





3.1 Objection: Anarchy will descend if citizens feel entitled to break laws based 
on their personal assessments of injustice 
There are serious objections that could be made to any civic obligation that endorses 
unlawful activities. The duty to be law-abiding is what makes participatory democracy 
functional – if citizens are entitled to break laws they disapprove of based on their personal 
ethical judgements, the value of using discussion to decide policy will be undermined. 
Compromises will be ignored by whichever group feels under-served or is simply obstinate 
enough to demand unfair advantages. This raises the threat of a breakdown of respect for 
law and consequently social order. Therefore, the duty to dissent, while it may exist to 
compel citizens to engage robustly in public discourse, cannot extend to law-breaking 
activities. After legitimate decision-making has taken place, the citizen’s duty is to abide by 
it in service of social stability. Civil disobedience is only justifiable from the standpoint of 
personal conviction and always runs the risk of civic irresponsibility.  
There are two ways to respond to this objection. First, it’s a slippery slope fallacy; 
society can tolerate a certain degree of law-breaking without disintegrating. The duty to 
dissent has many reasonable limitations and wouldn’t threaten stability if implemented in a 
measured way. Besides, the potential threat of social instability lies at the extreme end of a 
range of outcomes which includes at its opposite pole the evil of an authoritarian 
government. Beyond infringing on the rights of minority groups, the iniquities of an illiberal 
state can produce existential crises such as those posed by war and climate destabilization.  
Second, personal judgements are not an illegitimate basis for political participation, 
including civil disobedience. The community’s common sense of justice is not unimprovable 
and requires input from citizens to be maintained. 
 
3.2 Slippery slope  
 The duty to dissent could be accused of providing the foundation for mass disorder. 
However, society already tolerates a certain level of illegal activity without descending into 
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chaos. Some laws are disobeyed out of convenience, such as pedestrians who cross the road 
outside of designated zones and times. Other laws fall into disfavor, particularly those 
concerning personal morality, and so are generally flouted. For example, more than twenty 
states in the US classify adultery as a crime. In five states it is classed as a felony and in 
Michigan it can carry a life sentence, although nobody has been charged with adultery there 
since 1971 (Jarvie, 2007).  
 Citizens already practice a qualified disregard for the law in situations where it 
seems to be routinely flouted, rarely enforced, or where it is an example of gross overreach. 
When conscious of engaging in lawbreaking, people likely perform a cost benefit analysis 
and decide to proceed or desist based on factors such as how likely they are to be caught, 
how severe the punishment would be, and whether or not they consider the law to be an 
important or meaningful one. The laws against adultery and recreational drug use are prime 
examples of laws that are frequently broken because people disagree with them in principle 
or don’t really think they will be punished. Limited and discriminate lawbreaking is 
therefore compatible with the maintenance of the social order. 
It can reasonably be responded that endorsing a political duty to practice civil 
disobedience is not at all like tolerating limited instances of unlawful behavior. Herbert 
Storing argued that civil disobedience cannot be safely endorsed: “The broad result of the 
propagation of civil disobedience is disobedience. The question then becomes whether the 
encouragement of disobedience endangers law and civil society, and the answer seems clear 
enough […] that it does” (p94). Storing expressed cynicism that disobedience will always be 
conducted with respect to the rule of law, particularly in the cases of “the desperately poor, 
the degraded, and the bitter” (p94). This argument can be dismissed as a slippery slope 
fallacy – Storing provides no reason for thinking that socially sanctioned civil disobedience 
will lead to a breakdown of law and order. He does not distinguish between acts that are 
dangerous, like bombing a public building, and those that simply inconvenience citizens or 
authorities during their daily lives, like sit-ins or marches that disrupt the flow of traffic. 
Although less opposed to the practice of civil disobedience than Storing, Raz makes a 
related argument: that the possibility of inspiring others to protest for their own causes is a 
reason to limit the legitimacy of civil disobedience even when one’s cause is just (p269). But 
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besides the fact that our example could inspire others to join our cause, we may welcome 
protests from others with causes we had not previously been convinced of and come to 
champion those causes ourselves. We cannot expect to agree with the goals of every act of 
dissent, but we should value the pursuit of justice for its own sake. There is also the 
Gandhian “safety valve” argument: the idea that civil disobedience is an appropriate 
channeling of dissatisfaction that may otherwise spill over into revolutionary fervor. It’s 
rational to prefer that those we disagree with express themselves through rallies and 
marches rather than with militancy and violence (Haksar, p152). 
Storing and Raz both make stability a goal above justice, prioritizing the duty that 
citizens have to keep the peace. However, only an authoritarian government antithetical to 
liberal values can ensure that no unwelcome dissent ever takes place. Storing tips his hand 
when he refers to those suffering in society; the implication is that a certain amount of 
inequity and injustice is liable to arise as a side product of any functioning society, and our 
concern should be making sure that even those with legitimate issues do not threaten social 
stability. There are two ways to respond to this. First, this attitude assumes that stability can 
be easily maintained in the face of injustice. It’s the imposition of unjust conditions, not the 
practice of civil disobedience, that will produce citizens more likely to commit crimes and 
refuse to contribute positively to society, as eloquently expressed by James Baldwin: “the 
most dangerous creation of any society is the man with nothing to lose” (p67). 
Second, the duty to dissent does not entitle citizens to bring about a social order 
exactly to their liking, at any cost. It compels them to pursue justice outside of legal 
channels, because of the very real danger that corruption or incompetence will pose a lethal 
threat to some or all members of the community. There is the threat of authoritarianism, 
which could severely threaten the non-contingent needs of many citizens. Most German 
citizens did not profit from the Nazi regime; its expansionist policies led to the country 
being invaded, causing huge loss of life and devastation of infrastructure, whereupon 
competing global powers kept it partitioned for decades. Even worse, actions taken or failed 




The global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the environmental destabilization 
caused by climate change are two such examples. Writing in harsh condemnation of the 
existence of nuclear weapons, Bertrand Russell warned of the dangers inherent in trusting 
the government to operate with neutrality: “The state makes the laws and, unless there is a 
very vigilant public opinion in defense of justifiable liberties, the state will make the law 
such as suits its own convenience, which may not be what is for the public good” (p155). 
Scientific evidence has shown for decades that certain human activities are threatening the 
stability of our planet’s ecology and could mean the end of our way of life or even the 
extinction of our species. Yet the world’s governments have set regulatory goals far below 
scientists’ recommendations and then failed to meet even those in favor of maintaining the 
status quo, privileging existing industries over human welfare.  
These examples demonstrate that, quite apart from civil disobedience posing a 
danger to society, an excess of obedience could be the more credible threat. Even in the 
worst-case scenario where civil disobedience leads to mass disorder, that may be rationally 
preferred to the consequences of tolerating injustice placidly or proceeding in an orderly 
fashion to our doom. 
 
3.3 Improving the common sense of justice 
 The second way to address this objection is to reject the conventional claim that 
personal moral convictions are illegitimate motivations for civil disobedience. Rawls 
stipulated that the only legitimate justification for civil disobedience is to protest laws or 
policies that conflict with the common sense of justice shared by a society (p365). However, 
due to the ineffable nature of society’s common sense of justice, there are good reasons to 
think political action may be justified or even necessary when a citizen’s aims appear to 
conflict with it. Singer argued that we shouldn’t consider the common sense of justice to be 
immutable: “Maybe we cannot ourselves see improvements in a particular society’s 
conception of justice, but we surely cannot rule out the possibility that in time it may appear 
defective, not only in its application, but in the fundamentals of the conception itself” (p89).  
In effect, Rawls has set ‘improving the common sense of justice’ outside the purview 
of citizens’ active political participation. This would mean that campaigning for heightened 
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protections for animal welfare is not legitimate simply because society is not overly 
concerned with it at present (Singer, p90). But the common sense of justice of a society is 
informed by the political decisions that have been reached, and in turn plays a part in the 
political education of the next generation of citizens. Thomas Jefferson wrote that the US 
Constitution should be replaced every 19 years, to allow it to continue reflecting the shifting 
values of society (p385). Consider the difficulties citizens would have in responsibly 
exercising their right to vote if they were supposed to defer to the existing common sense of 
justice. Given that voting is meant to establish which candidates’ proposed policy changes 
are favored by the electorate, it would be paradoxical to ask citizens to vote only in support 
of what is already comprehensively judged to be just.  
In response, it’s possible to argue that this paradox is not an issue in the case of 
voting because voting is legitimate political participation, whereas civil disobedience is not. 
But this logic cannot be applied to undermine the duty of dissent without begging the 
question. If political participation such as voting may be justified on the grounds of personal 
convictions because it is legitimate, it cannot be argued that the same does not apply in the 
case of civil disobedience without first designating it as illegitimate. It is just this point that I 
seek to dispute. Either the common sense of justice should be fixed and not allowed to 
evolve, or it is permissible to seek to alter it through legitimate political participation. 
Whether or not civil disobedience falls outside of the definition of legitimate political 
participation is a separate matter. 
Some people would eagerly bite the bullet and endorse the prospect of preserving an 
immutable common sense of justice, despite the difficult of defining it. Even the originalists 
who hold that the intentions of the authors of the US Constitution are of paramount 
importance when applying it to settle legal disputes disagree about how best to interpret the 
text of the Constitution. But supposing agreement could be reached on a precise definition 
of the common sense of justice, we cannot take at face value that laws or policies presented 
as in keeping with it truly are. After all, politicians have a vested interest in presenting their 
policies as representative of the will of the people. Politicians tend not to campaign on a 
platform of openly opposing the will of their constituents, yet the will of most US citizens is 
often conspicuously absent from government policy-making (Gilens and Page, p564). There 
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is also reason not to accept that even widely expressed viewpoints are truly representative of 
most citizens.  
Take public opinion of gun control legislation. The National Rifle Association is a 
hugely influential group that lobbies Congress to prevent the introduction of such measures. 
It presents itself as representing the views of its gun-owning members and defending the 
constitutional rights of all citizens. The NRA spends ten times as much as the largest group 
lobbying for gun control legislation, and during election years spends tens of millions 
funding negative ads undermining candidates they perceive as in favor of gun control 
(Weiss and Gould, 2018). Citizens pondering whether civil disobedience aimed at changing 
gun laws is justifiable could easily be misled, by media campaigns and politicians who sell 
themselves as champions of gun rights, into thinking that widespread gun ownership is one 
of the common values of US society.  
However, polls have found that 84% of US citizens, as well as a slim majority of NRA 
members, actually support the introduction of the universal background checks that the 
NRA opposes so vehemently (Brown and Igielnik, 2017). The fact that the NRA exerts so 
much more political influence than groups that support gun control, combined with the fact 
that it does not really represent the interests of its members let alone most US citizens, 
means that they actively distort public discourse. Interest group-based lobbying is perfectly 
legal, so gun control is not the only issue potentially clouded in the public discourse due to 
outsized influence from wealthy organizations. This kind of difficulty in accurately 
perceiving the genuine common sense of justice of a society provides a strong reason not to 
grant it primacy in determining the legitimacy of an act of civil disobedience. 
Going further still, even if the genuine common sense of justice of a society could be 
agreed upon and was plainly evident, we still should not trust that it is truly representative 
of the autonomous will of citizens. In theoretical discussions citizens are often presumed to be 
logical, duly guided by self-interest and a rational assessment of outcomes. On the contrary, 
people can be short-sighted and display cognitive biases even when operating in good faith. 
Their political views can be informed more by prejudice and ideology than by a rational 
appraisal of the available evidence. In the context of women’s preferences constructed in 
male-dominated societies, Carol Hay points out that “even those choices that appear to be 
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unproblematic cases of simple preference-satisfaction are suspect. For if oppressive forces 
have perverted the content of a preference, it’s hard to see how that preference can really be 
called an autonomous one” (p100).  
Social discourse is too polluted with propagandistic claims from various industries 
and career-oriented politicians to imagine that citizens’ stated preferences accurately reflect 
their considered response to the relevant facts of the matter. Instead of being limited by any 
interpretation of the existing common sense of justice, we ought to allow citizens to 
prioritize their own moral and rational assessments in political decision-making – that way, 
the law may continuously evolve to more closely reflect shared ideals of justice. As Wofford 
put it, “The law is not some final arbiter. It is the voice of our body politic with which we 
must remain in dialogue” (Wofford, p66). 
 
Conclusion 
 I have argued that a defeasible duty to dissent exists for the citizens of liberal 
participatory democracies, conferring a civic obligation to practice civil disobedience. The 
two primary justifications are to provide a safeguard against the erosion of liberal values 
caused by corruption or incompetence, and to protect the rights of minority groups that are 
fundamentally ill-served by the democratic model of majority rule. I close with a quotation 
from Clara Urquhart on the Nuremberg trials that illustrates the indispensability of a 
positive civic duty to disobey lawful injustice: “There it was agreed that obedience to 
unethical laws was judicially and morally wrong. At his trial Adolf Eichmann pleaded: ‘It 
was not I who persecuted the Jews; this was done by the government. I accuse the 
government of abusing my obedience. Obedience has always been praised as a virtue.’ But 
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